The political economy of self-help: Kenya's Harambee Institutes of Technology by Godfrey, E. M. & Mutiso, G. C. M.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecomimons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
(a) UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
(b/) Institute for Development Studies 
Working papers 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI. 
¡Bi 
\ . 
\ • 
v \ 
Working Paper No. 107 
LIBRARY 
1 ° FEB 2C:1 
INSTfTUTE OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
The Political Economy of Self-Help : Kenya's 
Harambee Institutes of Technology. 
By 
E. M. Godfrey and G. C. M. Mutiso 
• 
June, 1973. 
íny vi'ews expressed in this paoer are tírase of the author. They 
should not be interprete^ as reflecting views of the Institute for 
Development Studies or of the University of Nairobi. 
IDS 
095678 
THE-POtTTTCAL ECONOMY "OF SELF-+ÍELP: KENYA-HARAMBEE 
STJTUTES OF TECHNOLDEY 
E.M. Godfrey and G,C=f¡'i. Mutiso 
Abstraed 
Since mid-3,971 local self-^help coiTimitte^s throughout 
t - \ 
Kenya have been raising large sums of 
of harambee institutes of teghnolcgy, .By April 1973 such institute 
hajH been proposed for Kiambu, Kirinyaga, .Murang*a, .Nyeri, .Embu, Meru 
Yatta, IViombasa, Kajiado, Kerieho, Nakuru, Kihancha, l<pLsii, Kisumu, 
Kairíiosi, Kakamega. apd Sang'alo. The plans of the proposed institut 
var^ a great deal, (aut most of them are airnirig to provide some 
kinql of technical tt*ainirig. to those who have finished secondgry 
i' ( 
school form IV. In this paper we try to place this fascinating 
fundi-raieing campaign in its politieal and economice backgrognd 
taJLook--forward_a±LÍdiejMssiblB-^fBcts that the establishment of §uch institutes,might have on Kenya
1
s aconoray-antí aoci^ty. 
THEJ^CUJnTCAL-ECO^ -KENYTT^S.JÍARAWBE.'E" 
INSTTrUTHS-OF TECHNOLGGY 
By 
E.M. Godfrey—artd G.C.IW. Mutiso 
Since J£zfci~-1971 local self-help committees throughout Kenya 
have been raising large sums of money for the establ-shment qf harambee 
institutes ,of technolpgy. By April 1973 such-instituges had hesn_propased^ 
for Kiambu, Kirinyaga, Myrang'a, Nyeri, Embu, Mery, Tai7fca
r
JMÓrnbasa, 
Kajiado, Kerieho, Nakuru¡ Kihancha, Kisii, Kisumu, Kaimosi
:
 Kakamega and 
Sang'alo., The plans of the proposechTjrstitutes vary a greatideal, but 
most of them are aiming to provide some kind of techrdcal training to. those_ 
who have finished secondary school form IV. In this paper -éíej try to place — 
this fascinating furrd—raising campaign in its politieal and edpnomic back-
ground and to look fonjvard at the possible effeets that the establishment 
of such institutes might have on Kenya
3
s economy and society, | 
A. The Background \ , 
The background to the emergefxie of the campaign for Vhe inati-tu-tes 
of technology is one that_jLnextricably combines politics and ecqrpmics, If 
we sepscS3ífc them here it is only ft3r~purposes--X3f--c.!l earer exposltinn and ncrfc 
because we regard them as separable processes. The politieal,fodees 
emanate from.what has been happening, or ra.ther not happening, yirhin the 
ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU.), For various¡r^asons 
KANU fcres failed to establish itself as a strong politieal party kyfch a 
systematic ideology. Thus the perjjid from 1962 to date can be re|jarded as 
one of increasing depoliticisation, with the ggvernment reíying¡more and 
more on the legitimising role of the Presiderrfc, M2ee Jomo Kenyatta, and on 
.control via the provincial administration and £5ss and less on politics, 
i i 
As a result politieal processes have devolved from the national 'centre to 
the periphery and local harambee activity has become an importarit arena 
within which politieal leadership at the local level is determinpd. 
We can illustrate this view by dividing jbhe period si^ce 1962 
into three: (l) 1962 - May 1965; (2) June 1965 - April 1959; and (3) May 
1969 to the present day. (l) 1962 - May 1965 could be regarded ks the 
period during which KANU suppressed regionalism by absorbing the leaders 
of Kenya African Democrstic Union (KADU) and Akamba Feoples Paréy (APP). 
This ivas effeetive at the national level but it, created problemé, v/hieh 
persist today.. in the former KADU and APP aress, pf conflict between lo©al 
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factions, with KANü 'A
!
 gróups consísting of those who had been associated 
with the party since its beginning and KANU 'B' of those who had not. A 
second branch of the government's policy to supprc¿s regionalism in this 
period was the strengthening of the provincial administration. The 
provincial commissioners became confirmed in their role as the agents of 
the centre, a role which became increasingly important with the abolition 
of the regions in 1964 and the reintroduction of licences for political 
meetings. 
(2) June 1966 - April 1969 is the period during which the "party-
line" leaders Consolidated their position within KANU. This group consisted 
of former KADU members and those who had always been identified with Mboya 
within KANU. Their rigid enforcement of a more conservative party line 
displaced several national leaders who moved into competition at the 
district level, where they quickly took advantage of the platforms offered 
by sponsorship of local harambee. Indeed some of the bitterest political 
in-fighting between 1966 and 1969 was in the harambee groups. The 
provincial administration reacted to this threat to existing (and correctly 
'party-line') local leaders by attempting to control harambee groups and 
banning those which they regarded as blatant covers for politicians. At 
the same time the new Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU) was characterised by its 
opponents as strictly a Luo affair and the use of tribalism as a way of 
competing for national leadership became part of th- pplitical currency. 
(3) May 1969 to the present dav saw the final withering away 
of KANU as a national party and a hardening of tribal attitudes. The 
Gem by-election of May 1969, in which the KANU candidate was crushingly 
defeated, sparked off a critical eight months during which Mboya was 
assassinated, the KPU was banned and Odinga arrested. In Mboya's absence 
the task of organising the primaries for the 1969 general elections passed 
to the provincial administration. In the ensuing elections, partly as a 
result of the primary selection procedure, 5 ministers, 14 assistant 
ministers and 77 members of parliament lost their seats and a significant 
body of 'new men', having more in common with civil servants and academics 
than with the pre-1969: political leaders, entered parliament. The 
hardening of tribal attitudes, which was an obvious result of the events 
of 1969, was intensified by the announcement of two planned coups. For 
obvious reasons the details of who were involved and towards what end are 
not available to researchers but the net effect s<=ems to have been to 
retrench the Luo and the Kamba back into the tribe. At the time of writing 
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in spite of desultory efforts to revive it, KANU is at its lowest ébb* with. 
branch elections, postponed since 1971 because voter registration is so low, 
still not ha'ving been held. President Kenyatta
7
s annour.cement that there 
wi!,
1
! be parliamentary elections in 1974 makes it likelyt~that the reórgani— 
saticrn of KANU will be further postponed, MPs are concentrating oh 
ensufing re-eler/tion rather than reorganizing the party. 
While politics was moving from the centre ta the periphpry and 
i 
beccming increasingly tribal and the provincial administration was
;
 conso-
lidgting its position of strength, important chunges in the systercj of access 
to rewards were taking placed. At independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a 
system of extreme inequaiity, with fcur-fifths of the high-potential land 
\ \ 
in the harids of less than 4,000 Europeans, and a racially-determined wage 
! 
and salary stfdcture,such that in 1£/61 22,000 Europeans eartied an aVerage 
wage of o^er K£l,350, 33,000 Asians just over KE500 and 530,000 Africans 
about Since then the preoccupation has been not so much to charge 
this str¡i¿ture as to remove its racial basis. So during the 'sixt'ies 
Kenyanisaíion was extended from the/public to the private sector, partico-
larly th^ larger foreign firms,andf through loan,credittraining and 
extension-programiTies and control ¿ver trade licensing, the g^-owth of a--& 
class of African errtrepreneurs waj encouraged. At the same fdme large 
áreas of land were transferred from Europeans to Africans in j:he fcrm of 
settlement schemes or individually-owned large fa"rms. But th¿ basically 
unequal structure of income distribution remained, 
r 
at a rate of 
/ 
Mea^while, althouah the economy was growing fast, 
! ( 
about 7 ¡per cent per year at constant prices, wage emplcymetjt í q the formal 
sector v^ as growing much more slowly, at a rate of less than 2 per cent 
artnually. Moreover, educational enrolmeijfc was expanding, with a particularly 
fast rate of increase at secondary level, so that che numb^r of fe 
jobs available-was-being^rogressively outstripped by the number of these 
whq hádbeen led to expect that they would obtain such jobsl Paradojkcally 
;/ '' / \ .' 
enougti it was this growing excess supply of edqcated job~-seekers, combined 
/ / i i 
with'vthe\use of educational criteria ^n hiring, which ensured,that thfe 
pal%pical^forcé.that was gathering bef-q.nd the harambee groups, in the Vay 
¡üescribed 'pbove, would be directed towards specifically educational proNects, 
As-primary-rschool leavers found it more and more difficult to obtain fon^ü. 
se¿tor jobs it^became increasingly necessary for them to equip thernselves \ 
j \ v 
fór selectiunyPor such jobs by attending secondary.school. If sufficient \ 
dary school places were not available locally, and the governnent --
* The obvious debt úf these ilwo paragraphs to the ILD report J p . p a r t i — 
oularly chapter 6, is ackrjbv/ledged. 
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showed.no signs of providing them, then an ideal-harambee projectj combining 
a large expected private- benefit for its contributórs "(or their children) 
with. a handsome political pay-off for its main sponsors., was born. Anderson 
has shown in recent paper J_ 15 / the amazing rate at which such harambee 
secondary schools were created, to the extent that by 1970 they accounted 
for 62 per cent of secondary schools',and 41 per\cent of their enrolment. 
• 
Áll this fits .in we11 with a hypothesis recently put forward by • 
Fields [_ and Rado / 1'3_/ under the ñame of the. "explosive model".. 
The model has two simple basic assumptions. The rate of increase in 
output and thus in opportunities for remunerative employment is determined 
exogenously (that is, it is not affected in one way or another by changes 
in educational provision) and is lower than the rate of increase in the 
potential labour forcé. (2) Employers, faced with an excess of applicants, 
select by level of education. These two assumptions give the result, 
particularly when as in Kenya the distribution of income is extremely 
unequal, that while the social return (in terms of output) on additional 
investment in education is zero, private demand for extra education is 
very high. As Radc puts it, "the more unprofitable a given level becomes 
as a terminal point, the more demand increases for it as an intermedíate 
stage; a precondition for the next level of education." This imparts an 
explosive nature to the expansión cf private demand for education, which 
gives rise to pressure on governments to increase educational facilities 
and such phenomena as the harambee secondary schools. 
Within this framework it is predictable that harambee groups 
should seék further projects within education. What is en first sight 
less predictable is the change in direction that the proposal for harambee 
institutes of technology represents. One might have expected more secondary 
schools and, particularly, since Form IV is now no longer a profitable 
terminal stage, their extensión beyond that point to Form VI. The possibi-
lity that seme of the more ambitious communities might have gone for their 
own harambee universities, to increase cpportunities for Form VI leavers, 
wculd also have fitted in thé framework of this model. This latest 
harambee effcrt, however, is not in any of these academic areas but in 
technical training, a field in which there is evidence that, while qualifi-
cations exert a powerful influence, employers pay at least somé attention 
to performance criteria in their hiring practicés. For instance, it seems 
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likely that trainees from the Christian Industrial Training Centres with 
primary schooling plus two years' CITC training are preferred for the 
same jobs to those who have spent fcur years on "pre-technician" courses 
at' secondary technical schools. This suggests that a concern of the 
planners ana supporters of the harambee institutes has been te identify a 
secticn of the labcur market in which demand exceeds supply and to meet 
that excess demand, rather than to continué to participate in the scramble 
for more and more acaaemic education.. In doing so they have made educational 
history, since technical*training in
v
 Africa, has traditionally been something 
that was foisted on unwilling recipients by paternalistic colonial 
governments or fereign advisers. As King /9 / says
9
 Kenya is the "first 
country voluntarily to espouse technical training on this scale in Africa". 
This change of heart seems to be mainly related to changes in the labour 
market. Colonial attempts to "make education more practical" were premature 
in the sense that academic education still offered a higher private rate 
of return. In this respect, as Anderson points out, it is interesting to 
contrast the public enthusiasm for the idea of the institutes of technology 
with the relative failure of xhe village polytechnics to attract mass support. 
The institutes promise access to wage-earning jobs. The village polytechnics 
are concerned with 'rural self-employment.' It could almost be characterised 
as a contrast between indigencusly identified private benefit and social 
benefit as identified by non-participants. 
B. Plans and Possibilities 
So far we have been concentrating on the background to the 
emergence cf the institutes of technclogy and have said little about what 
they intend to do. Rather than treat each institute individually we have 
summarised their plans and fund-raising progress in Table 1. 
Perhaps the most" striking aspect .of this table, apart from the 
size of the targets, is the lack cf progress.shown by mest institutes towards 
those targets. Apart from Embu, Maa, Sang'alo and Kaimosi, which are 
building on existing iñstitutions, c-nly two of the proposed institutes 
(Kiambu and Murang'a') lóok to be anywhere near their planned fund-raising 
targets.' It begins to appear, therefore, that the crucial determinant of 
the institutes' achievement and- impa.ct will be the amount of foreign 
capital aid that they are able to attract. So far (see page 21).only . 
Kiambu, with its 6.7 million shillings from the Netherlands, has been 
successful in this respect. If we were to take a pessimistic view about 
aid prospeets we might assume that only those institutes which have already 
raised at least 40 per cent of their fund—raislng target (plus those with 
special accnss to foreign funds) will go ahead as planned. This extreme . 
assumption would allow through only Kiambu, Murang'a, Sang
f
alo and Kaimosi. 
Their combined enrolment by 1977 would total only about 2,000 compared with 
projected enrolment in existing training institutions in 1977. of over 11,000. 
We do not. intend to predict that only four will go ¿head as planned but 
the assumption serves to illustrate that the immediate impact of the new 
institutes may be rather smaller than had originally been thought. 
Nevertheless even in the fairly immediate future the institutes 
will be making demands on the econpmy which may be difficult to meet. 
Elsewhere 6__7 we have calculated, for insfcance, that existing plans for 
output of Kenyan technical teachers are likely to be insufficient even for 
existing institutions, Moreover, foreign teachers are not readily availohle. 
As thé Wamalwa committee ^14 p. 327has warned, "it would be mcst unvd.se to 
plan these colleges on the assumption that suitable training staff in 
adequate numbers can be obtained from overseas, since there is a global, 
shortage of technical trainers." The use of overseas 'volunteers* can 
provide a breathing space but is hardly a long—term proposition. As Table 1 
shows, most institutes are planning to take secondary school form IV leavers, 
There will, of course. be no shortage of such people although the ifístitutes 
will be competing with existing institutions for those who have had some 
prior technical education. Preliminary orientation courses will probably. 
be necessary (and are planned by Kiambu and Murarag'a) before training proper 
pan start. Kipg p, 2 1 J raises an irrfceresting point about possible 
lack of interest on the part of students, citing the low ratio (1.3) of 
applications to places on the Kenya Polyteehnic*s form-V-level science '7„ 
courses. On the other hand, the Kenya Industrial Training Institute 
receives over 2,000 applications for 80 plaoes on. its one-year skillecKLevel 
course. The main determinants of the number of applications for places in 
a training institution are likely to be the level of fees charged and the 
exterrt to which the courses offered improve a traipsee's immediate chances 
of getting a well-paid job. In both respects.Km probably scores better 
than the Polytechnic's A^-level Science course. For such and many wther 
reasons, the level of fees and the nature of the.courses-offered at the 
ipsrtitutes will crucially affect their prospects. 
The surrent financing problem is illustratod by the case of 
Kiambu which has gone further in its detailed planning than most of the 
other institutes. The most that it will be able to raise towards its urjlt 
/ 
i 
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cost of 6,000 shillings per studerrt, through ooffee sales
T
 sale of students' 
procKKrfcs--arid—srervdees and the donation of volunrteer-teachers from overseas 
is 3,000 shillings peí—stuéerrW-—Sther^-colleges have other-s-chemes.for 
raising current finance, including Ramogi I.A.T's endowment fund ar 
Valley
t
s 2,700-acre cattle farm, but all will be faced ~with-a__similar gap 
between current revenue and expenditure, far too large ta be plugged by 
\ i 
any reasonable scale of fees. The institutes' planners are aware of this 
problem and confiderrtly expect help from the government once they are in 
operation. As we emphasise in pages 21—27 the government is certainly 
symphathetic towards the institutes, But educational expansión has already 
brought acute financial problems and the Ministry of Education is under 
pressure to stabilise its budget. The total current expenditure at initial 
full capaeity of the seven larger institutes shown in Table 1 as planning 
to open before the errd of 1974 ife about 33 rnillion shillings annually. If . 
we exelude those which seem too far from their fund-raising target,to 
achieve such an early oper¡ing thq' remaining four (Kiambu, Murang'a, Kaimosl 
and Sang'alo) represent a total Current expenditure of about 12 million 
shillings annually. The institutes are likely to be under pressure to lirrrit 
the extent of the government*s ^Lbsidy by such means as chargicg high fees, 
seeking employer, sponsorhip or partieipation in the national industrial 
trairdeg scheme, perpetuating the use of 'volunteer* teachers docated from 
overseas and lowering the leve/ at which training is offered. 
r 
Apart from making demands on- the eeonomy for resources the 
institutes will of eourse be turring out each.year large numbers of trainees 
who will have to find jobs or self—employment. Wj_l¿ u,Hc r>--~=tfirrk any 
problem? On the basis of a eemparison of Table 1 with a syrvey of ;sd.st±ng 
training provisión acd nlans for its expansión and.of the government's man-
power survay, disoussed more fully elsewhere.^"6J
}
 there is no doubt that 
if all the institutes.carried out all their plans excess supply of trained 
manpower would result, particularly in the case of engineering teohnicians. 
However, fund-raising diffioulties make it unlikely that more than a few 
institutes will come into operation in the next year er two and current , 
tlnsncArig -dl-fficulties make it unlikely that many will be able to operate, . i 
to start with, at higher than skilled level at least in technical subjeets, 
Thus their immediate impact on the trained—labour market is likely to be 
smaller than seemed possible in the euphoric early days of the fund-raising 
cempaigns. Nevertheless, particularly if we look further ahead, the puestion 
orf what "would happen if ~the supftly crf t ecb ni cally—trainecí people exceeded 
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employers' demand for such people has to be faced. One possibility that 
can probably be rejected straight away is that wages and salaries would fall 
to allow the absorption of the increased supply, since the Kenyan formal-
sector salary structure has se far shown remarkable resilience in the face 
of enormous changes on the supply side. Excess technicians and craftsmen 
would, rather, need to look fer opportunities in self-employment. The 
crucial question then becomes whether the Kenyan economy is yet at a stage 
where it can offer much in the way of opportunities for lucrativa self-
employment to expensively-trained technicians. Experience in training for 
self-employment, fer example in the village polytechnics and the Kenya 
Industrial Training Institute, has not so far been encouraging in this 
respect.* Less tangibly and more optimistically, such a significant 
increase in the numbers of trained technicians may impart a more technical 
orientation to society and open new areas of innovation. One way or another, 
an excess supply cf technically trained people would have profound social 
and political as well as economic effeets. 
So far we have discussed what might be called the direct inroact of 
the institutes via their demand for staff, students and current finance and 
their output of trained people. They are likely also to have several 
important side-effeets. 
First of all, as Mbithi has pointed out [_ 10, p.l63_/, harambee 
of this kind represents a transfer of resources from productiva use to 
consumption, or at least to less immediately productive use (particularly, 
as is likely in this case, if the time-lag between fund-raising and fruition 
is long). Analysis of ccntributicns is not yet possible, but it is already 
clear also (see page 18} that, although conspicucus donations are being 
exacted from the elite, most local contributors are in lower income-groups, 
particularly small farmers. Thus there are likely to be important effeets 
on the distribution of wealth and income'." This will be particularly so 
if the institutes persist in their intention (see table 1) to offer courses 
mainly for form IV leavers and set their fees at 1,000 shillings per annum 
or more. It would then be only a slight exaggeration to describe the situ-
ation as the raising of meney from the poor to provide channels to jobs for 
" See Court 2 and 3 J and Godfrey 5_7
 f o r
 further discussion of the 
problems involved. 
** The effect depends on how the lower-income groups finance their contributicns. 
They may reduce consumption, reduce 'investment' in farm inputs etc., or sell 
assets, particularly land and cattle. These are in ascending order of long-
term effect on income distribution. 
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those sons and daughters of the rich who failed to get into university. 
As- well as accentuating inequalities between classes within 
regions there is alsc a danger of accentuating inequalities between regions. 
It is no accident that Kiarnbu and Murang'a, two of the richest districts, 
have so far been able to raise the largest amounts locally. Moreover, 
since the richest región is also the most influential politically, it seems 
likely that foreign aid will reinforce rather than counteract the disequa-
lising effect. It is no accident that Kiarnbu has so far been the only 
institute to attract large-scale foreign aid. Of course, politics is not 
static and one could make various predictions of
 1
success rates' fcr 
institutes depending on the foreign aid implications of future political 
scenarios. Most of the feasible ones, however, involve continuing regional 
inequality. 
As well as affecting regional econcmies the institutes are also 
likely to influence regional and national politics. We refer in section 
C (page 1M-) to the return to their areas of ethnic origin of members of 
the elite other than professional politicians. This obviously has healthy 
effects - in particular the breaking of the myth of the omnipotent politi-
cian and the cpening of new channels thrcugh which local political demands 
can make themselves felt. In this way the institutes are being used as an 
important means of forcing accountability on politiciens. There is, however, 
a negative side. It is quite possible that the institutes will strengthen 
majimbcistic feeling. In some cases this was exolicit in the aims of the 
founders. Spokesmen of at least six institutes, for instance, have spoken 
A 
of university or university-college status as an eventual possibility, 
while others, recognising the competitive nature of the situation have 
argued that their area must have an institute because it
 ,!
cannot afford to 
be left behind". Whatever the aims, the process of interaction creates 
unification. Regular meetings of ethnic elite members are being held 
leading to contacts which would not ctherwise have been made. 
From the point cf view of their 'Majimboism effect* the institutes 
could be divided into three groups. (1) Those competing on an inter-ethnic 
basis include Coast, Rift Valley and Western. In all cases ethnic unity 
has been threatenad by prcblems of choice of site. Lack cf agreement on site 
at the Coast, which probably includes the largest number of ethnic groups, 
ultímately allowed the Provincial Commissioner to step in. There is still 
A <v 
The idea of creating several new universities in this way seems particu-
lar ly dangerous from the point of view cf its effect on national integra-
tion. A tribal university is a contradiction in terms. Multiplicatión 
of universities also makes little sense in the light of educaticnal prio-
rities. 
anxiety last lo catión in Mombasa would. leaci to its bei-ng taken over by ., 
"interior people" . as is the case with oth-er. educational institutions in 
the town. In Rift Vallev the decisión ta lócate in Nakuru has led to 
splinter tertdencies; of these Samoei has been squashed* and Maa is too 
small in scale to pose a tnreat, but a Kalenjin Institute of Advanced 
Technology is still ^ possibility, Western,CAAS was planned as a provirr- . 
cial college, embracing the Luhya, the Teso, the Kalenjin and the Nyangori, 
but soon became embij'oiled in site and leadership problems. Efforts to 
patch up intra-tribal rivalries have failed and it seems likely that the 
province will now hjave three institutes, Western, Kaimosi and Ganglio, 
(2) The second grpup are the institutes which embgdy purely irrtra-ethnic 
competitiori. HCiaryibu, Murang'a and Kimsthi ^Nyeri), in particular, have 
institutionalised'rivalries which some argüe are as oíd as the Kenya . 
African'llnion if not Kikuyu Central Assocdation. (3) The third group 
consists of those areas which are seeking ethinic direction and look to 
the institutes as a meer.s of unification. Ramogi IAT is the most obvious 
case ánd is particularly inrteresting ir. its atternpts tg reduce tribal dis 
sidende by keeping out politicians. Ukamba A.I., also, is a case where 
non-politicians have tried (unsuccessfully) to eliminate factionalism by 
dcvising a belanced natiohal boriy and carefully choasing a site on the 
border between Machakos and Kitui, Kipinyaga and Meru are similar cases. 
The planners of the institutes have been careful tofergue that 
•they will be national institutions open to all. Wnether or not this will. 
be the case will probably depend primarily on 'market
:
 factars; in a situ-
ation of excess local demand for places an 'outside* quota becomes difficUlt 
to enfcrce. (Whatever the outcome in this respect. the process of increasing 
intra-tribalinteraction may be both result and causo of greater tri'palism -
an ironical result of a process of compietition for leadership betweerj some 
of the most cducatcd members of the ethnic groups,. The only consolation 
is that the particular groupings that have emerged, particularly the four-
way split in Central Province, are less dangerous than some others that 
could be thoiight of. 
Lude A final note should be inclu d about some of the possible 
educational qffeets of the institutes of technology. Do they, for 
instance, mjrk the end of ths 'educationaA.explosion' described in. section 
A? This looks unlikely, Although they are a deviation from the explosive 
rrrodel, if they prove successful in placing their trainees in jobs they will 
Although at the time of writing it is showing signs of revival, 
\ 
/ 
probably be faced with an axcess of applicants .and may react to this by 
•raising entry qualifications, This has already happened to training 
institutions, such as the.National Youth Service, whieh were orlginally 
intended for primary school leavers. Thus the scramble for academic 
qualifications es means of entry could be encouraged rather than discourv. 
aged by the institutes. Moreover while the enthusiasm for technical. 
jtraining is new and, in a sense,- revolutionary from the educational point 
Of view, the'curricula and syllabuses are unlikely to be innovative. 
Pressure from both the Ministry of Edueation and employers will be,for 
T
recognised' qualifications (i.e. trade tests and City and Guilds), and 
it would be a brave principal who resisted such pressure in view of his t 
immediate need to demónstrate the employability pf -his products. 
C. The Institutes and Previous Harambee 
In section A we tried to show the way in which the campaign for 
the institutes of" technology emerged from a oonjunction of political and 
economic trends. .In the course. of this attempt usr made same references to 
previous harambee, particularly the secondary schools. It seems worthwhile 
now to take this a bit further and to look more carefully at the specifi* 
cally harambee aspects of the institutes. What. are the similarities and 
differences between these and previous self-help projects? 
Holmquist _,/ ?, p. has characterised self-help as "pre-
emptive development", "Groups try to pre-empt the field of contestants by 
convincing the government that it is politically snd economioally unwise 
to deny support to a superior local effortV In the process a,ny, central 
plan that may exist is ignored. "Even if a coherept plan e^ists, .... the 
strategy of self-help groups is to purposely go beyond the plan because.. 
they probably would not receive aid without pre~emptive local effort.,,,, 
Rather than helping to shift'the burden o-f development from government, 
self-help activity may serve to generate even more demands upcrn government 
from below." Thus in choosing a project the primary considcration for a 
harambee group will be the likelihood of its being taken gver by the govem-, 
ment, The bid for government resources, as Colebatch ¿ 1 , p, 12/ points oUt, 
may consist, as in the case of health centres,, merely of erecting a buildin© • 
or may extend, as in the case of,secondary schools, te; starting to run. the 
institution with local resources, but the attracrtion of government help is 
the main point. 
The institutes of technológy sesm to fit into this general, 
pattem. Indeed, the way in which they were chosen as projects suggests" that 
their initiatcrs were looking for something not only likely to be taken over 
by the government and to attract overseas aid but also unlikely to be indepen-
dently initiated by the government. Thus the project committee of the Coast 
Institute of Technology was at one time considering raising money for extensions 
to Mombasa Technical Institute (now Mombasa Polytechnic) but dropped this on 
hearing that the government was already planning to develop M.T.I. with overseas 
aid. The possibility of a technical school in Taita was also dropped in favour 
of the Coast Institute of Technology which was thought more likely to attract 
g^jjpathy from the. government and from overseas. Similarly Kiarnbu rejeoted further 
aoaSemic secondary schools because there were already several in the area and an 
institute of technológy looked potentially more attractive to government; 
Kirinyaga chose technical training because government development prograrnmes in 
water, agriculture, health and academic education seemed adecúate; the Ukamba 
Agrioultural Institute was preferred to an irrigation Scheme because it was. 
felt that the government would ultimately deal with water; and Murang'a dropped 
the idea of extanding a hospital when it became clear that this was already 
included in government plans, Thus King's tentative characterisation of , 
the institutes as bids fnr projects that were already planned by the government, 
as well as gettirn the time sequence wrong, seems to be a mis-reading of the way 
in which harambee works. The point is not to choose something whieh you know 
is already in the government 's plan but
?
 rather more subtly, to forcé the govern-
ment to go in a direction which, although not in the plan, you knqw will be dif— 
ficult for it to resist. Otherwise, why would Mombasa and Kisumu, which have 
already successfully attracted to themselves government projects in technical 
and vocational training (within the plan), nevertheless be persisting with fund— 
raising for their own harambee institutes of technology? 
Ancther aspect of harambee, stressed in section A, is its role 
as a vehicle for,personal political ambitions. This is also emphasised by Holn>-
quist. "Leaders, by promoting development activities, are able to enhance their 
own standing in their areas and they compete \yith each other over who will be 
able to initi^te the largest, most successful, and,most numerous development 
projects" p. 222J. It also, es Colebatch ¡1, p, 13_J7 pcirrts out, works , 
in the other direction. "If a man cannot establish his political effectiveness, 
it will be difficult to maintain support for the self-help projects he has 
pí TJfflOtldd • " He cites the example of a harambee secondary school which collapsed 
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for want of pupils when the MP who promoted it was defeaWd in the election. 
The institutes of technology are vsry much within this tradition. -As,Mr. 
Onamu, defending himself in a letter to the Daily Nation (54'- Mpvember, 1972) 
against chargés of using Kaimosi college for political purposes\ asked,; 
"which of the colleges of technology have not got the leadership pr support 
of politicians?" ünlike most previcus' harambee projects, howeyer,\ each of 
the institutes is too large ánd covers too wide anarea to become the 
personal property of a single leader. Thus quarrels over leadership partly 
explain the multiplication of institutes in some areas, particularly Vtestein 
Province, and the deadlock within institutes in others, particularly Ükenmba' 
and Meru. . • • ' \ i 
Moreover, in an important respect the institutes-of-techrrálcgy• 
-campaign-T'epresents something entirely new in Kenyan politics - the return V 
to their areas of ethnic origin of members of the élite other than profes-* 
sional politicians. We will use the term 'non-politicians' to describe this \ 
group, consisting of those wha are not and never have been Members of Parlia-
ment or KANU party officers at national, provincial or distrist level.. Qur 
use of this term should not be taken to irnply that'we think these nornpoli-
ticians are non-political; indeed, part of our argument is that they are 
playing a highly political role. The point is that this group has not tended 
/ * 
to get much involved in harambee before. Previous projects have tended ta 
be on a smaller scale, covering an area no bigger than a división, and 
dominated' by MPs who used them as a rjieans of iriteracting with their ccmsti—-
tuents. We argued in section A that, as the process of depoliticisation 
•Ti 
bontinued and public meetings were regulated more tightly by the provincial 
admihistration, harambee was about the only chance for such interacrtion that 
was open to MPs. Such non-politicians as did frequent their homo areas were 
regarded by MPs as a threat. ' MPs' anxiety about this group has intensified 
since 1969 when many members lost their seats to non-politicians who. argued 
that their education and/or
 ;
bureaucratic experience fitted them for political 
leadership. Scarcely'a week goes by without an MP camplaining about/the 
political activities cf non-politicians, particularly civil servants, asití 
parliament likes to reassure itself occasionally that civil servants who 
involve thernsélves in politics must resign their posts.. 
The importance of non-politicians in the insti±utes-of-techrtology 
csmpaign can be illustrated in various ways, Table '2, for instance, shows 
the composition of the institutes' critical committees by category of member-
ship. We established whether or ncrt committees were 'critical
1
' by chécking 
the sequence of-decie4qrHT«3king on (a) whether to establish a college, (b) 
(d) mereberahtp of all committees and (e) furtd—raising. 
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Table 2: Exetxitiw/Cprñ^ttBgsJb^Cfet of IV® 
J 
1 i 3 fo 2 • 0 20 
25 
a 0 • o 0 0 , 8 12 
o p <- c 1 I- 0 !o 3 f " 
2 1 2 4 0 l as 25 
1 « 1 • 1 Q o •25 27 
4 a r«t 3 
79 
0 46 67 
o 6 n n x
1 
0 1 15 32 
. i • 
0 1 o i o 0 j 7 9 
0 1 i • o í 0 • 6 17 
0 • •s . o ] p ¡ 1 0 15 20; 
0 0 i 0 0 4 1 6 8 
0. 1 0 , 0 .1" ..Q i 10 3,5 
0 o 8 „ --A 0 - Q , 1 4 7 
-•t 
8 as- .,12 9 H 7 \ 
185 275 
a 
b 
Exeludes Eiribu, Maa (Kajiado-), Kalenjift anf At^atój^ dá&a are. iptcomplete. 
!? The four are "Nairobi city coupcillors s.nd the '^ápo^-of Nairobi." . i 
^Project cdmmittee and trust ees. " ' • " 'i?. v 
Combined trustees and executive committee. '•'. V j. 
e
 Oombified fund-raising committee in Meru and initial Nairobi-based purriculum . 
Committee. i 
•p -• 
Governing Council. 
s
 Six representativos of wonren's organisations and one representative of spedal • 
interests (the Asian Community). . 
^ Project oommittee and finance tactics committee. 
All Coast Province county councillors. 
J
~Irrberim sxecutive
T
 plarming aqd appeals/publicity committees. 
"S •  
V • • v ^ • • • " ' • • • " ... ' 
r All Kisii chiefs,-.. • .»-.-. • 
i • ... ' • •.••. , • ' - r 
' Project cammittee. 
\ Executive afficer, chil.d welfare society. 
Women's representative on rnain committee — a professional social worker, 
Fund-raising committeé. 
From this we can see that 'politicians
1
 (categori.es 1-3) 
^epresent less than a third of those involved in tha!critical committees 
'^nd are significantly out-numbered -by those in the 'no^-politician
1 
.tegories, mainly cicil servants '{categories 4 and 5;, managers in the.j 
vate sector "(categcry. 9) and universi-ty staff and stydents (category 6). 
he fact that members of parliament are the largest single'category ahows 
hat they are aware of the institutes as a significant political iá|ue,, 
owever, as far as active partlcif>~rion in decisiCT^nakirig is j^Titórned, 
'the important categorieé ha^e bsen the national bivil servartM and istatutory 
/ ,. .... ';,.'.. • f. •• "W 
•board %ánagersS.ancl. ¡unis^rsity staff and students (cgfcegorfcfes. 4 and S). 
V: ' ' ; r
:
"
:
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Category 5, composed mainly of people who are not from the area in question, 
L^s ¡important for controlling funds (see pages 16-21) 
| -Another indication of the importance of non-noliticians in the 
institutes is the fact that they form.the majbrity of the holders nf 
nacional office. Table 3 shows the three main national officers of eách 
ir^titute by category. 
^ ' a ' 
Table 3; Chairmen, Secretarles and Treasurers by Category 
Treasurer ' Chairmen Secretary 
1 
Kiambu 4 6 
Kirinyaga 4 •• ' 4 
Murang'a 9 
• • • • . . ' 6 " 
Kimatfii 
! 1 
1 . • 3 
Embú'.' 
i
 r
 ... 
± .5 
Meru 5 8 
UkaMba 11 9 
Coast^
5
 ./ 1 9 
Maa/ •;/.. 6° 
Riffc Valley 1 6 ' 
Gusii 9 1 
Rambgi / 
J / 
Kaimosi 
' 1 6 
10 1 
Wpsterrí 1 6 
Sarrgaj.o 6 13 
4 
4 
9 
7 
3 
5 
4 
9 
L3 
4 
4 
9 
6 
/ / 
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 Exeludes Kalenjin and Abakuria for which data are not yet complete, 
For the Cosst I.T, the P.O., as chief administrator and coordinator, is 
coirrstitutionnlly and functionally above the chairman. 
c
 Formerly with the university. 
Of the forty—five office-bearers in the table only 26 per cent 
are politicians. There is an interesting specialisation by functioo with 
the politicians concentrating on the 'figurehead* role of chairman, non-
politicians on those of secretary and treasurer, A large proportion of 
the secretarles consists of university staff, while civil servants forrn 
the majority af treasurers. Significantly, in view of past sxperience 
with harambee funds, only one of the treasurers is a member of parliament. 
More telling than any statistical analysis, however, is an 
analysis of the way in which the institutes were initiated and the major 
decisions made. In at least eleven cases the initiating role of non-
politicians seems to have been crucial. In Kiambu, as.early as 1968 a 
loca.! teacher and later a provincial education afficer, a city council 
education officer and sénior civil servant provided the inicial Ímpetus, 
In Nyeri the initiative,carne from the district commissioner, and Mr. Kibaki, 
the Minister of Finance, and not ane af the district factional leaders, 
was elected chairman of the trusteos; the executive committee 
was later to talk of the need."to commit our MPs towards the goal af cal-
lecting funds towards our K.I.T." The Ímpetus for Kirinyaga carne from the 
permanent secretary and his deputy in the President's Office; the latter 
sent the initial letters and the former steered the first caucus meetings 
before the wider
-
 district.leadership was involved. The idea for a Murang'a 
district development fund, not tied ta any particular praject, carne from 
a group of Murang'a businessmen in Nairobi; the major irritiators of the 
idea of using this fund for a college of technology were Mr. Gecaga af 
B.A.T., the university registrar and the chairman of the Xenya Commercial 
Bank. In Meru, with its three hostile political faction^ the district 
commissioner had to play an initiating role, backed by 'nor^palitician* 
members of the elite mainly working outside the district. In the case 
of Ukamba A.I, an irrterim committee of academics ,civil servants and busi-
nessmen took the important structural decisions before bringing the 
politicians in. In Kisii the idea was put forward by Abagusii university 
students who then called a meeting of Kisii leaders. Ramogi I.A.T. can 
also be traced back ta pressure from university students, who since 1958 
had argued for a university in Luo Icnd; throughout the plartning stage 
it appi s that norr-politicians were dominant, with neither Mr. Odinga 
I 
... - f 
ñor other prominent- Luo politicians beijig brought írrto the discussions,, 
with the oxception of Mr. Oguda, Assistant Minióter for Foreign Affairs, j 
who plsyed an important role, perhaps because of his position as IShairman 
of the Luo MPs and a representative of South Nyanzc, Sangalo seems to 
i 
have been pushed mainly by Bungorna civil\ servants in Nairobi. Kaimosi 
which has the longest history of detailsd preparation,tracable brrck to 
1958, was regarded all along as a Quaker qhurch project y.dth no active 
involvement of ptrlitrtd^ms until very recently. Thp idea, of the Coast 
Institute of.Technology was conceived by Fa*. Shako, Minister for Tourism 
and Wildlife, but it has become very much the creature of the Coast 
provincial commissioner. 
Thus it appears that, unlike previous harambee, the organisers 
and inítxstcrs of the institutes of technology have been primaríly 'non-
politicians' and in mq.ny cases conscious efforts have been made to exelude 
professional p:liticians or te allot them a subordinate or symbolic role. 
To. cali them non-politicians does not, as wa have emphasised, imply that 
they are playing a non-political role. Just how political the role of 
some of them has been may beccme clearer when the candidates for the 1974 
elections declare themselves, 
But perhaps the most obvious contrast between the institutes 
of technology and previous harambee is one.of shear size.• As Table
 ;
1 shows 
initial fund—raising targets for the larger institutos vary frgm 10 to 
30 milliori shillings; and the combined target of, for instance, the-three 
institutes planned in Eastern province is .43 millian shillings, • compared 
the.total of-the pra vinco harambee contributions for all purposes 
in 1971 of about 7 million shillings. 
The size of the amounts to be raised has been one of the reasons 
for the involvement of the provincial administrstion in fundr-raising'for 
most institutes. The orototype fund-raising orgartisations are those of 
Kiarnbu ancTMurnng'a. .The district commissioner sets targets for each of 
his district officers, who pass similar instructions on to chiefs and sub-
chiefs. ,In each ares minimum scales of contribution are laid down., In 
Murang'a, for instance, every male is sxpected to pay at least 10 shs, every 
female 5 shs. In addition all employed p'ersons are sxpected to pay according 
to salafy on a. sliding-ecale ranging from 40 shn for those earning 200 shs 
per month to 1,000 shs for those earning 5,000 <-k, There are also specifin 
contributions expected from special categóries, e.g. tea growsrs, coffee 
growers, milk cooperatives, harambee groups, seoan^ary, primary and .nursery 
\ • V 
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schools, bus—owners, lorry-owners, wholesalers, .retailers, hotel,. ' ... 
restaurant and bar owners, petrol strtieri owners, matatu-operators, etc. 
Those who have several roles make a contribution relating to each of them. 
Similar fcrms of organisation are operated by other institutes, particu-
larly Coast, Kimathi, Meru and (after initial hesitation on the part of \ 
the provincial administration) Riat. Indeed P.'eru's D.G, made a careful \\ 
study of fund-raising mothods in Kiambu and Murang'a before designing a \ \ s similar system for his district.
 v 
The extent of compulsión that is. applied in order to raise. 
uontributions varies from área te arca. In parts of central province proof 
that institute-of—technology contributions have been paid is demandad 
before any dealings with officialdom (e.g. payment of schoal fees, purchase 
of a licence) are allowed. At the coast workers and teachers were. dismayed 
to firrd that their unicns had agreed to a 25 per c nt deduefeon frro their 
salaries, vrhile in Nakuru deductions were actually made from teachers' 
salaries without their consent. In both cases protests brought immediate 
assurances that contributions were to be strictly voluntary and refunds 
of any money that had been deducted. There have also been complaints., 
mainly from Central Prorince, of forced deductions from agri cultural produce. 
In some areas there has been trouble with bogus collectors, although pro» 
bably less than if the provincial administration was not being used. In 
general, the dilemma of fund-raising is that the amounts needed are so large 
that even in the most errthusiastic areas a measure of compulsión becomes 
neoessary. Compulsión has not, of courss, been unknown in previous haram-
bee but its extent, within a formalised systsm of collection-, marks a new 
stage on the slope from harambee to a form of regressive taxation.* 
Common to virtually all institutes, also, is the attempt to 
raise furtds by designating as "founder-members" or "life-members" those 
who make specified, large contributions, usually in the range of 1,000 
to 2,000 shs. Such pressure on elite members who warrt to retain local in 
influence is irresistible. Even in those areas where fund-raising is more 
loosely organised than in the K^mtau/l'urr-mj *a model, approaches are usually 
made to particular groups. In Kisii, for instence, there is hea\iy reliapce 
on contributions promised from teachers million shs), pyrethrum farmers 
(5 million shs), coffee farmers (5 million :hs) and tea growers (2 million shs); 
while UKAI has had the interesting idea of setting up sub-committees of 
emirient people to approach those in their own area of specialisation — ,e.g. 
tourism and hotels, general business, construution and estáte agencies-, 
* See Mutiso ¿ 11 and 12_J for furthsr discussion of this point. 
printers and booksellers, large-scale farmers, etc. etc. It is usual, 
also, to have committees of dispersed kinsmen in the larger towns; indeetí, 
some towns with a large population of 'strangers.* may be sending more 
money out to other areas vnan they are raising for their own institutes. 
Then, of course, there are the well-tried techniques of harambee fund-
rai'sing such as huge meetings chaired by top,politicians at which ñames 
and contributions are named, dances,. raffies, sponsored walks ar)d 
badges. Such methods have, in the case of the institutes of technology, 
broken all previous harambee records. At !y!urang%
J
s initial funql-
raising meeting 1.3 million shs was raised, while on a similar occasion 
<iambu was. able to announce the amazing total of 6 .9 million shs, 'Even 
•;hough some of the cheques were ncrLzLmmediately honoured these represent 1
 i 
new levels of achievement i n harambee. i 
) An interesting aspect of the fund-raisinq, again related to i 
fyne size of the targets, is the way in which sourues of funds other than 
kirismen are being tapped. Local and fareign-owned firms, individual 
Ásian and Eurxpean c i t i z ^ r i s and r i ü t í X x L t i z e n s a n d . Africans (usua^Lly poli— 
.¿icians) fron other areas usually fe¡. 'cure in lists of contributors. 
^ome firms make a point of corrtributing equally to each institute, but , 
the richer institutes tend to g a i n more from this process (for instance, 
Lpnrho gave the equxvalent of 3 2 0 , 0 0 0 shs to K i a r n b u ) , Asian involvement 
in the institutes is largely cpnfined to contribution of money (particularly 
important in the case of Riat), although there are a few involved in ~ . / 
p^snning, fund-raising and organisation (e.g. in UKAT and Meru). The 
enterre to which Africana are contributing aeross ethnic boundaries is 
difficult to estimate., There have been some,spectacular examples: 
Prefeident Kenyatta's 5 , 0 0 0 shs to Riat and lOjQOCTshsto Rift Valley; Vic&-
Pres^dent Arap Moi's S ? 5 0 0 shs to, Kaimosi and 8 , 0 0 0 shs to Kiarnbu; ,
J
.M, 
Karii^ki's 5 , 0 0 0 shs to Riat and 7 , 0 0 0 shs to Kisii. And many leading $ctors 
haveitaken.out founder membershlp of a number of institutes. Riat, in 
particular, seems to have attracted substarrtial support of this kind 
from oertside Nyánza. Understandably, however, even those who have contri— 
buted away from home have tended to reserve their largest contributions 
for their own areas. 
Spectacuíar though the local harambee effort has been, these 
projects are so large that the institutos' sponsors are being forced to • • 
-'ÍLiaofc Bufcside the oountry for a large proporfcion of their funds. Among 
countries approached for aid by the vopious institutes are the Nethierlandsj• 
* * *
 4
 y ¡ • * • 
i 
the USSR, the US, the UK, India, Italy
1
, Denmark, Norway, France and West 
Gerrrtany, So far, apart from token contributions from embassies, tvvo 
institutes have been successful in attractiñg large soale foreign support, 
The Netherlands government is making a grarrfc of some 6.7 million shs towards 
the total cost of Kiambu's first two phase9 óf 17 million shs, whils a large 
part of the funds for Kaimosi's first phase ras come from Quaker organi— 
sations in the US. As 'private' projects tfrfz institutes are not allowed í ' 
to receive aid direct from forreign governmerrts, but Kiambu has shown how 
i • • 
this can be fcircumvented, Its aid is nominal-ly from a church organis-±±Dn 
¡ i : | ' • ' • . • • • • ' • ' 
but actually from the Dutch government whicil has a joirrt—finencing arrang&-
merrt with the church organisation. Aid is being sought not only for 
L 
capital expenditure but also in the form af technical assistance; this 
may oopsist partly of young volunteers to steyf the institutes in their 
/ 
early etages. All of which adds up to the fact;, that, utalike previous 
/ \ 
harambee projects, foreign supoort will be crucial to the success of the 
I ' l i 
I \ 
institutes of technology, at least if they ara tp go ahead as planned. 
• i l t i 
D. • Towards a Political Economy of the Institute^ 
\ /. . I V 
The institutes of technology have been legitimised at the highest 
> \ 
levels of government, with the President taking an aéfciveKpart in various 
/ i \ •• 
i \ 
•4 r 
i \ 
ways and many rainistérs*'and assistant ministers being involved in their 
own area's institute. It is "perhaps "éignificant that only one member cf the 
government, an assistant minister for home affairs, has spoken publicly.-
against the institutes (his particular concern was with the role that civil 
servants were playing). It is in fact clscr to most ministers that non-
involvement in the movement would be politically suicidal,, Ivloreover the 
'ncflV-politicians
1
 realise the usefulness of politicians in fund-rsising and 
invariably take steps to involve them. Ministers are therefore 'forced* 
into acquiescing, even when unenthusiastic, and of course they take the 
opportunity of the fund-raising activities to keep themselves in the public 
eye, Indeed in the cases of Kiarnbu, Murang'a, Riat, Ukai, Rift Valley
 r
JSCAAS 
Embu and the Coast it is possible to identify ministers or assistant 
ministers who are involved because they have no choice. Moreovor they are 
expected to be active in raising money. 
* As can be seen from thé followíng list showing ministérs and the institutes 
for which they are workinó in one capacity or another, only two ministers 
are not actively involved, as far as is known: 
Vice-Presidept, Daniel Arap Moi, Rift Valley;" 
Minister of State, Office of the'President, M. Koinange, Kiarnbu; 
East African Minister, R.J. Ouko, Riat; . 
Minister of Agriculture, J.J.'Myagah, Embu; 
Attomey -.General, C. Njonjo, Kiaríibu; ' 
Minister for Commercs and Industry, Dr. J.G, Kiano, Murahga; 
Minister for Cooperatives"and Social Services, M. Muliro, VCAAS; 
Minister for Defence., J.S. Gichuru, not actively involved; 
Minister for EducatL ón, Taita Towett, Rift Valley; 
Minister for Defence, J.S. Gichuru, not actively involvéd; 
Minister for Finence aj»d Economic Planning, Mwai'Kibaki, Kimathi; 
Minister for- Rpreigñ. Affairs, Dr. Njoíoge Mungai, Kiambu; . 
Minister for Health,'Dr. Z.T.'Onyonka, Gusii; 
Minister for Housing, P. Ngei, Ukai; 
Minister for Information and Eroadcasting, R. Matano, Coast; 
Minister for Labour, E.N. Mwendwa', Ukai; 
Minister for Lands and Settlement, J.H, Angaine, not actively involved; 
Minister for Looal Government,'J.C.N. Osogú, i'.'CAAS; 
Minister for Natural Resources, W.O. Omamo, Riat; 
Minister for Power and Communications, I.E. Ornóla Okero, Riat; 
Minister for Touriám and Wildlife, J.L.M. Shaka, Coast;. 
Minister for Works, J. Nyamweya, Gusii. 
1 • / . 
A point that has already been made is the intimate involvemerrt 
of the government (basicélly the provincial administration) in the process 
of raising funds. For instance, the P.C., Coast, is the main mover of the 
Coast institute. The P.C., Central, has not been personally active but his 
• 
D.Cs, D,0s and chiefs provide the structure for fund-raising. The P.C. 
Nyanza and his D.Cé, D.Os and chiefs do not ssam to have as great a role as 
other provinces but again they provida, the fundf*raising structure. In . 
Eastern Province, Embu and Meru are dependent on the provincial adminis— 
r 
tration fot organisation while Ukai relies on it for local fund-raising. 
The P.C., Western, has been embroiled in the quarrels between \MGAAS and. ., 
Kaimpsi". 
ajid between WCAAS and Sang'alo. In Rift Valley Province the P.C», 
D.Cs, D,.Qfe and chiefs are clearly an important part of the formal structure. 
\ r 
This involvement of government at thé local level is justified by the 
planners' of the institutes. as both a check on the honesty of fund-raising 
aftd as an aid to efficiency in raising very large sums. I ' 
!•" So far, although (or, rather, because) individual members of 
the government have given the institutes top—level support and the 
provincial administration has been allowed to involve itself in their orga— 
pisation, little has emerged in the way of an active government policy 
towards the institutes,. The Ministry of Education has registereri. those 
institutes that have applied as unaided educational institutions, In his 
frireword to the pamphlet produced by Murang'a •SütcPresidcnt stared"'that, 
"despite the fact that Murano'a College of Technology 
was not origxnally. 
included in the Kenya Development Flan 1971/74, mv Government will accord 
the highest priority in the allocation of any funds at its disposal far the 
development of technical education in Kenya:. and in this connection 
Muramg'a College of Tachnclogy will feature prominently." This pledge was 
generalised in parliament in December 1971 by the Minister of Education who 
said that the government intends to take over the institutes "when' they 
mature." Understandably the Treasury is mora cautious, merely offering 
assistance "at soms future date if such assistanee is deemed necessary and 
d e s i r a b l e , T h e Ministry of Education has offered the advisory services of 
its technical seetion in planning procedures and curricula. As far as is , 
known the planners cf the institutes have not taken advantage af the offer, 
* From letter fram the PermaPent Secretary, fALnistry of Firrance and EconOmic 
Planning, to the Secretary, Kiambu Institu e of Science nd Technol gy, 
dated 10 February, 1971. 
preferring ta use the services of such experts as they have on their own 
committees or to employ professional c o n s u l t a p t s T h e expected.appoirrfc— 
merrt of a full-time advis r to the institutes, financed by UNESCO, may.be 
intended to rectify this situation, Government attempts ta coordínate the 
activities of the institutes have s.o far come te nothlng. A committee 
for this purpose was set up within the Ministry of Educatlon and a meeting 
of represer.tatives of the -institutes was called. However, as a prerequisite 
of the meeting the institutes were asked tp fill.in a detailed questionnaire 
(including questions on planning, officers, site, proposed development, 
courses offeréd recruitment of students and finance). As must surely have been 
known, very few institutes are in a position to answer such questions; only 
three replied and the meeting has pe ver been helií. In a situation where not 
only ministers and assistant ministers are involved but also top civil 
servarrts in all ministries provide the main Ímpetus behind their own insti-
tutes government cautian on this issue is hardly. surprising. 
i 
\ As well as appeal to gofernment a criteriop which we suggested. 
fpage 13 j must have been in the minds of the institutes' founders is appeal 
to foreign aiders. Here they seemed to be on firm ground. As King 
£~9, p, 185J wrote in early 1972, "as far as overseas inclinations are con-
cerned, tnere is probably a cood basis for Kenya
f
s confidence in attracting 
substantial. foreign aid ín this sphere.... Although there may.be difficulties 
in the actual allocation pf aid to regional self-help schemes, it would appear 
that there would be no shortage of foreign assistance for what will be see® 
as eduoetíonal 'realism' at last by an African courrtry." This was certainly 
how the Dutch government ssw it in its•allocation of aid to Kiambu. As the 
institutes haré multiplied, however, so have .the aiders pulled in their horns. 
There seem to be two inter^-connected reasons for this. Firstly the uncont— 
rolled mushroaming of projects is seen as a denial of central plapningí this 
argument carries particular weight with the World Bank. Secondly, the whole 
phenomenon is seen as having become too "political" and thus darigerous for 
bilateral aiders. With t.be Dutch having got what might be regarded as the 
'safe' -project other bilateral aiders are scratching their heads and looking 
into their crystal balls. This will ..not prevent them from offering small-
scale aid, swch as textbooks and volwnteers, but is likely ta delay the allo-
cation of large-scale capital aid. Foreign companies operating in Kenya, on 
This has put the smaller institutes, without an extepsive ethnic elite and 
without money ta oay consultarrfcs, at a disadvantage. 
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the other harsd, are eRthusiestic. Their donations to the institutes (usually 
spread over a number) are, of oóurs'e, partly a political Insurance policy, 
but also a reflection of their preference for a surplus to a shortage of 
technicians and craftsmen. Moreover, for those who operate in relevarrt 
fields there are opportunities to supply equipment and matérials to the 
institutes and, more subtly, to secure longei>-term benefits. One such 
company, for instance, has offered a grant to an institute to put on cpurses 
• in the.use and repair of.that company's equipment, The equipment will, of 
course, be provided free, a small price to pay for the leverage on cjovern— 
ment and other users offered by the later flooding of the market with 
craftsmen and-technicians trained in the use of th§t CQUÉprnoflt and no other. 
As far as the wananchi ere concemed it.is in the perceived 
interests of tribesmen to support"their institutes, either as a way of 
ditersifying and increasing opportunities for themselves and their children 
and of forcing accountability on their politicians or as a means to ethnic 
reunifieation. During the field studies in July/Awgust 1972 we found very 
few people who claimed to oppose the idea, although there may have been 
some vagueness as.to what the idea actually was. According to a fi/lurang^ a 
County Councillor, for instance, corrtributors are told "that they are 
contributing the money for a school, ..nd they know that one time their 
children will go to that school."-* Also in Murang'a, trccurrfcy cconcil rnti.ee, 
/ ^ 
announces the imposition of a 10/- "tax" which vri.ll help towards "the school 
which you haTe heard of for Technology." Yet if the institutes persist in 
'their intention~tc admit mainly secondary school leavers the majority of the 
bontributors will fee-1 little direct benefit, There are signs that they are 
pecoming aware.of this possibility. For instance, in Nyanza, where the ranks 
pf corrtributors are linked to the historical miiitary hierarifey, those who 
happen to be non—ranked because of their inability to make large contributions 
are askirg poirrtedly what chances their children have of getting into the 
institutes, In other parts of the country similar questions are arising. 
Moreover the high levies and the fund—ra.ising methods are arousing intense 
bitterpess, particularly in Central Province. In the wards of a Murang'a 
trader,' "we are not going to sit back and sing 'hallelujah' when our children 
are expelled from schools for non-paymerrfc Qf school fees, and when we cannot 
take them to hospitels when they rail sick, all in the ñame of 'harambee 
* Information from Hal' Colet¿etch. 
spirit."* Another matter which worries ccntributors is the need to make süre 
that the "politicians" do not eat the money as has happened in the case of 
other local projects. However, some -of the wananchi interviewed felt sure 
that this would not be so since "their educated sons" were there to watch o 
over the money. The issue of disappearing money is extremely important 
and is probably the main explanation of the incorporation of the provincial 
» 
administration into local fund-raising. 
An interesting intermediate category between the wananchi inter» 
viewed in fieldwork and the elites involved in institute activities is 
that ¡s*f primary school-leavers, educated enough to know that the institutes 
are not intended for them and their like, At a meeting of several hundred 
primary teacher-trainees sttended by one of the authors not a single voice 
sympathetic to the institutes was heard. Uainly primary school-leavers, 
they clearly saw^ themselves as a relatively deprived group. Their criticism, 
* 
concentrated on: admission of secondary-schcol leavers rather than primary-
school leavers or those with no education at all; lack of government planning 
and coordination; intensification of class and regional inequalities.; 
encouragement of tribalism; staff shortage'and increased expatríate presence; * 
possible employment problems; misdirection of investment; and use of the 
institutes to further personal.political ambitions. These views have been 
echoed in letters to the press, presumably from thG same "subelite' category .-
Neither the institutes ñor the government have felt the need to answer these 
views systematically as they carrv little political weight. 
The most coherent ppposition te the institutes has tjome from the 
professionel central planners — which, since most of the sénior indigenogs 
planners are involved in their own institutes.in one capacity or another, 
means largely the-expatriates. The general grounds for their apposition, w 
which was particularly strong in the early days of the campaign, are. fairly 
obvious. These projects were not in the plan and in purely central planning 
terms" they ere seen as not making sense. Quite apert from the question of 
the external efficiency . of e;-ptmding technical training, the institutes 
duplicate and ms.y interfere with projects already in the pipeline,* such as 
the upgrsding of Mombasa Polytechnic and the building of two more industrial 
and vocational training centres in Kisumu. and IVIombasa. They may duplicate 
each other's facilities. The facilities proposed by the institutes could 
* East African Standard. 8 February, 1.973, The speaker is referring to the' 
practice of demanding to see harambee receipts before allowing paymerit of, 
e.g,, school and hospital fees. (See above page 19). 
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be provided at lower capital and current cost in existing institutions. 
They will présent the governnSsnt with a difficult. problem of financing 
current expenditure when it talcas them over. Indeed they are seen as 
representing a pre-emptive bid for government resourees which will be 
of disproportionate benefit to the already richer areas. etc.ctc, 
The trouble with this kind of criticism is that it was based. 
on a misunderstanding of the situation in which the critics were operating. 
The planners were able to holci up Kaimosi college for several years when it 
was a single church—backeri project in a periphery without a unified voice 
in the centre, To prevent the whole institutes—of-technology bandwagon 
from rolling is quite another matter. At this point the institutes apparently 
have a unique capacity to serve the interests (political and otherwise) of 
the elites who are sponsoring them and to catch the imagination of the 
warrartchi who are contributing te them.. In a situation where members of the 
government antí top civil servants.are, with their "private" hats on, actively 
planning each their own institute, and where the government, through the 
provincial administration, ir intimately involved in the '^md—raising process, 
central planners would simply not be acting realistically if they urged
 !!
the 
government" (es if it were an abstraction) to take a hostile attitude 
towards these institutes. Such criticisms mc.y have had sorpe effect on the 
attitudes of potential donors¡ particularly the World Bank, but they carry 
little wcight within the government, The institutes of technology are 
definitely going to napoen; all that remains to be decided is the pretfcse 
form that they will take, 
To do them justice, the planners have now realised this and have 
inserted into the technical education section of the draft 1974—70 develop-
ment plan" n few paragraphs on the harambee institutes of technology. This 
carefully refrains from committing "the govemmerrfc" to dire«t help. with 
developme*Ft or recurrerrt costs, but promises assistance with coordination 
in the particular hope of avoidirtg duplication of expensive equipment; 
previsión for teacher training needs; and support services such as.the 
inspectorate,*the curriculum development unit and mass madiá - centra. A. few 
words of advice are siso included which seem ta suggest that the planners 
will try ta nudge the institutes towards craft rather than "henhniciaw-level 
courses. Since this is alsc the direction in which the logic of cost and 
staffing will
 :
 jk. bs pressing, they may well be successful. 
E. Conclusions 
Wc havs triad ta.show the wsy in v/nich the institutes df 
technology emerged from a K m juntrtion -f politice! and economic trends. 
During the first ten years of independence, in the nbsence of a strcng 
political party with a systematic ideology, politice in Keoya moved from 
the centre to the periphery and becarne increasingly tribal, while the pro» 
vincial administration consolidatsd,its-position of strength. At the 
same time the educational explosion, generated by the unequal and eriucation-
related structure of rewards, flooded the market with the merely academically 
qualified and made institutes of technology an attractive alternativo to 
secondary schools for harambee organisers, Thus the institutos presented -
themselves as ideal vehicles for determining local leadership at a time when 
•non-politician' mc-bcrs of the elite vere bsginning to^challenge the 
generation of politicians whic-h inherited leadership en independence. 
Although relativo lack of progreso in fund—raising is lifíely to 
limit their immediate irrpact sooner qc lator the institutes will be making 
demands on the economy, particularly ^or staff and current finance, which 
may be difficult to mpet. The prospect of taking over responsibility for 
their current expenditure rnust be particular!y worrying for the Treasurv, 
At the same time they vd.ll. be tuming put large numbers of trancos bjny of 
whom, unable to fine! vmge-Gornins Jobs, v-íill have to look for opnortunities 
in self—employment, .The eventual possibility of an excess supply of teohni-
§ally trained people, with its unpredictable social and political-as well 
as economic effeets, needs to be faced. 
In so far ~r the institutes trarasfer resources from immediate to 
less immediate productiva use they will slow down the rate of economic 
growth in their early years. Psrhaps more important is their possible 
discqualising effect aa inoome d^stributinn both between classes and 
between regions., f/íoreover the return to their areas of origin df the norv 
politician elite, while.having the abfious healthy effect of forcing accoun-
tability on politicians, rr.isss the dsnger of strengthening majimboistic 
feeling. Educationally, they are unlikely to mark the ej|d of the scramble. 
for.academic qualifications since these will be needed as a means of.entry. 
And, while the enthusiasm for technical training. is new and expiting, it is 
going to be difficult for the institutes to escape from the traditional 
•recognised* and imported system of qualifications. This, plus the likeli-
hood that the priorities of foreign capital-intonsive companies will shape 
their programmes, is the main thréat te the institutes' innovative .. 
potentiál and to the evolutiün of .locally—orientad technical training. • _ . 
The institutes seem to fit in well with the characterisation 
of self-hela as 'pre—emptive development' - a bid for rather than a 
substitute for government resources. Tn judgs from the way in which they 
were chosen, the ideal harambee project seems to be one which is likely to 
be taken over by the government and to attract overseas aid but unlikely to 
be independently initiated by "ttec government Like previous harambee projects 
the institutes are vehicles for personal political ambitions although on a 
much largar scale. Unlike previous harambee, they have involved 'non-
politician
1
.members of the élite in their areas of ethnic origin. Their 
importance in the institutes
1
 eampaign can be illustrated by reference to 
the composition of critical committees and of the holders of national 
office but, most convincingly, by an analysis"of their initiating role, . 
To cali them 'non-politicians* does not, of course, imply that they are 
playing a rtop-political role. The most obvious contrast with previous haram-
bee, however, is that of size. The size of the amounts to be raisetí has 
been one of the.reasons for the involvement of the provincial administration 
in fund-raising, the compulsión exerted on contributors, the tapping of 
sources other than kinsmen and the need to ]„aok outside the courrtry far 
a large proportion of funda. In particular, the transformatian af haram-
bee into a regressive taxation system is a subject into which more detailed 
research is needed, 
The way in which the institutes have attracted sup««ort at the 
highest level, with the President taking an active part and many ministers 
and assistant ministers being involved in their own area's institute, is 
impressive. The gcvernment., through the provincial administratian, is.also 
intimately involved in the process of raising funds. It is, therefore, 
hardly surprising that little has emerged in the way of an active govern-
ment policy towards.the institutes, beyond a vague promise of eventual 
government takeover. They have tumed out to be less apfiealing to foreigjg 
aiders than had been expected, partly because their mushrooming is eeen as 
a. denial of central plarwing and partly because they hí;"9s become too 
"political." Foreign companics, as hirers of skilled labour and suppliers 
of materials and equipment, are more erathusiastic. The lower,i«come-group 
who form the majority of contributors have supported the idea, although 
they are begirtning to ask questions about who will benefit, and collectio® 
methods are arousirtg intense bitterness. Primary school-leavers, who know 
that the institutes are not for them. talce a jaundiced view, but are not 
politically influential. The.most coherent opposition has come from the 
professional central planners, largely the expatriates. who are the only 
ones uninvolved in the institutes, Their criticisms, particularly strong 
in .the early days of the campaign, made, sense in central planning terrns 
but ignored the political economy of the situation, as they appear now to 
be realising. 
The institutes of technology represent what might be called the 
'la-st stage of harambee', whereby the full vveight cf individual members of 
the government and of the provincial administration has been thrown 
behind the raising of funds to build institutions the «urrerrt firancing of 
which will eventually become the responsibility of the government, l/'e 
have hoped to show that they are not an amusimg side—show but an important 
new development in Kenyan politics with important implicaticns in the future 
for the educational'system and the economy. 
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